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standing. The capacity to experience pain was not
sufficient to confer moral standing. But should one
nevertheless have had doubts about animals' cries of
agony and writhing in pain on the experimenters'
boards, there was always Deseartes (1596-1650) to
comfort one. He argued that animals only had bodies
but no minds. They were machines without conscious
mental states and incapable even of feeling pain.
Humans, however, comprised two separate entities, not
only a machine-like body but also an immaterial mind,
and were therefore capable of thought and feeling.
Today a Cartesian view of animals as feelingless
automata might seem completely counter-intuitive or
contrary to common sense. But why would we, who
have much the same physiological evidence for animal
pain as our seventeenth-century predecessors, bold more
humane views? First, between about 1500 and 1800 an
alternative, more humane, tradition to that of
Aristotelian-Thomian rationality and the Cartesian
machine model of animals emerged in England and parts
of western Europe among lay people and scientists alike.
So it would be wrong to think that our modern
sensibilities towards animals and the natural world had
no historical roots in the very time that the tradition of
typically human rationality and the machine model were
at their height.2 Second, between Descartes and us came
Darwin (1809-1882) wbo lowered humans from their
pedestal of uniqueness and dignity and demonstrated

Answer me, mechanist, has Nature arranged
all the springs of feeling in this animal to the
end that he might not feel? Has he nerves that
he may be incapable of suffering?
Voltaire (1694-1778)

1. Introduction
In the 1600s physiologists were beginning to
understand the functioning of the major organs of the
body and the circulation of the blood. James Rachels
tells us how these rapid and exciting advances were
achieved by experimental procedures which subjected
animals to excruciating tortures: "Dogs, for example,
would be restrained by nailing their paws to boards,
and then would be cut open so that the working of their
innards could be observed. This was long before the
development ofanaesthetics, and the dogs' vocal cords
would sometimes be cut so that their shrieks would not
disturb the anatomists." 1
Many thought that nonhuman animals (hereafter
simply 'animals') did not deserve any sympathy because
traditional morality, grounded in Aristotle and Aquinas,
made typically human rationality the criterion of moral
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the continuity between humans and animals. 3 Thus,
since the 1850s our knowledge of animals certainly
increased, but far more significant was that all this old
and new knowledge could now be located coherently
in the context of a background theory of evolution. A
rigid divide between, on the one hand, feeling and
rational humans and, on the other, feelingless and non·
rational animals became utterly implausible.
Still, even after Darwin science has often ignored
or denied animal consciousness, especially in the
heyday of behaviorism-a new Cartesianism-and
logical positivism. 4 Consciousness remains an
embarrassment to biologists because of the success of
neurophysiology in explaining behavior in terms of the
physical activity of brain cells which appears to leave
no useful function for conscious feelings. 5 Behaviorist
psychology aside, cognitive psychologists too are
suspicious of animal consciousness, even when they
recognize that it must be assumed to explain all sorts of
complex animal behavior, and in fact turn out to be
methodological behaviorists.6
But what about the philosophers? They also have
contemporary neo.Cartesians among their ranks. One of
them is Peter Carruthers, professor of philosophy at the
University of Sheffield. In 1992 Carruthers published a
book entitled The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in
Practice. Having assumed that animals have conscious
mental states for the sake of the argument in the preceding
chapters ofhis book, Carruthers argues in the final chapter
that animals are not deserving of our sympathy because
all their mental states-experiences (including pain),
desires, beliefs, and thinking-are non-conscious.
Animals have again become Cartesian machines. Like
the Port Royal followers of Descartes one could, on
Carruthers's view, torture animals with the confident
conviction that their cries of agony were comparable to
the noises from machinery.' Or, less dramatically, the
family veterinarian, who advises a dog owner that the
paramount consideration in the decision to euthanize or
not is the dog's suffering, is simply the latter-day
equivalentofa flat-earther, both holding irrational beliefs.
In this paper I wish to set out and assess critically
Carruthers's argument.

sympathy. His argument for this conclusion can be
summarized as follows:
PI: A mental state (such as an experience, including
pain, a desire, belief, or thought) is either
conscious or non-conscious.
P2: A mental state is conscious if it can be
consciously thought about, that is, consciousness
that one has a particular mental state is a
necessary condition for that mental state being
conscious as opposed to non-conscious.
P3: Human beings, but not animals, have the ability
consciously to think about their mental states.
Cl/P4: Human beings have non-conscious as well
as conscious mental states, but animals only
have non-conscious mental states.
PS: Having the capacity for conscious mental states,
such as the capacity for conscious experience
of pain, is a necessary condition for being an
object of moral concern that makes claims upon
our sympathy.
C2: Animals are not objects of moral concern that
make claims upon our sympathy.
This argument is valid, but I believe that C2, the
main conclusion, is false and that the argument is
unsound. In support of this view I shall analyze critically
each of the five premises on which C2 rests.8
But before I do this I wish to make a general
comment about the kind of argument that Carruthers
puts forward. It is an argument that draws a moral
conclusion from facts about mental states. I believe that
this is correct. Intrinsic moral value is aflirmative value
assigned by valuers (the sources of value) to certain
things (the loci of value) in virtue of their possessing
specific kinds of characteristics. More specifically,
mental states, which are objective features of some
living things, ground intrinsic value. Put differently,
living things with mental-state interests, in the sense
that certain things matter to them subjectively or
experientially, have moral standing or are objects of
direct or non-instrumental moral concern which makes
them direct beneficiaries ofmoral obligations. I believe
that this is neither a case of deriving an 'ought' from an

2. A philosophical argument against animal
consciousness and moral standing
Carruthers believes that animals are not appropriate
objects of moral concern that make claims upon our
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is based on that of Daniel Dennett, for whom conscious
experiences are those that are available for the subject
to report. Carruthers modifies Dennett by defining
consciousness not by its relation to speech production,
but rather by its relation to a faculty of thinking. The
ability to speak a natural language is however for
Carruthers only contingently connected with the
possession of conscious mental states.
I wish to make two critical comments about P2. First,
Carruthers gives an intellectualized or reflexive account
of the consciousness of mental states by identifying the
ability to be conscious with the ability to have thoughts.
But why must a simple experience of an external
phenomenon, or a feeling of warmth or cold, be
available for being thought about in order to qualify as
a conscious experience? Carruthers's account equates
consciousness not only with self-consciousness but with
self-consciousness of a certain kind, namely, reflective
self-consciousness. Only if one can think about one's
mental states are those mental states conscious, .and
thinking about an experience is a reflectively self
conscious activity. Again, why must an experience be
available for being thought about to be perceptually
conscious as opposed to being non-conscious? Surely
a conscious experience could simply be one that is
immediately present to the mind. There is another kind
of self-consciousness which is less intellectual than
reflective self-consciousness and which does appear to
be connected with consciousness or awareness, namely,
self-consciousness or self-awareness in the sense of
having a concept of self, of having a sense of self as
distinct from the world, or of knowing the difference
between what happens to one and what does not. 16 An
ability to recognize dangers and threats to oneself is
evidence of this kind of minimal or rudimentary self
consciousness.17
Second, if language is not a necessary condition for
consciousness, then it is not clear exactly why it is
contingently the case that languageless beings are not
conscious while only beings with the ability to speak a
natural language are conscious. This case needs to be
argued. Carruthers promises to do this in a forthcoming
book. 18 Presumably he will then have to show that
language-using creatures have a Chomskian innate ability
to speak a natural language that is made possible by innate
factors which are the very same factors that make
consciousness possible. But even if this were the case, it
could be argued that "understanding of reference and
meaning requires some non-linguistic comprehension of

'is' contrary to Home's dictum, nor an instance of
Moore's "naturalistic fallacy." This is so because the
relationship between fact and value in this kind of
argument is neither one of logical entailment of one
statement by others, nor one of defining ethics in
naturalistic terms, but rather one in which factual beliefs
stand in a relationship of support to a moral belief as
conclusion.9
3. The distinction between conscious and non·
conscious mental states

In Pl Carrnthers 10 draws a distinction between
conscious and non-conscious mental states. Any human
mental state-an experience, desire, belief, or thought
must be either conscious or non-conscious. Beliefs and
desires are either activated or dormant, and if they are
activated they are either conscious or non-conscious. 11
Non-conscious experiences, for example, involve brain
functioning, cognitive processing and behavior control
but no conscious awarenessP To talk of experiences
that are non-conscious is a strange terminological usage
since we usually link experience logically with feeling
or consider experience to be conscious by defmition.
But, as Carruthers recognizes, one could simply change
his terminology to fit this ordinary usage, in which case
some cognitive processing and behavior control would
involve experiences (which are by defmition conscious)
while others would not. 13
Examples of non-conscious experiences in humans
are the following: first, driving a car on a well-known
route without being consciously aware that one is doing
so while one's conscious attention is directed elsewhere;
second, washing up and packing away dishes while one
is totally absorbed by music that one has put on; and
third, the phenomenon ofblindsight where people who
have suffered lesions ofthe striate or visual cortex may
lose all conscious experience in an area of their visual
field while retaining the ability to describe objects
presented to them in that area.l 4
Carruthers next gives an account of the nature of
the distinction between conscious and non-conscious
mental states in P2. 15 A mental state is conscious if it
can be consciously thought about. The capacity for
consciousness that one has an experience is a necessary
condition for having a conscious experience. If I can
think to myself that X in appropriate circumstances,
then belief X is conscious. What I can think aoout is
equivalent to what I can think to myself. This analysis
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not for less intellectual cognitive abilities such as
thinking about an experience.
What should Carruthers have done? Clearly, be
should at least have considered the different kinds of
evidence for animals' ability to be self-conscious in
both the reflective sense and in the sense of having a
concept of self. The kinds of evidence I have in mind
are animal communication, language-using ability in
animals, animals' ability to recognize mirror-images
of themselves, and animal behavior in experimental
conditions as well as in field research. Weighing such
evidence is a task in its own right. My point is simply
that unless this is done we have little reason to accept
Carruthers's a priori argument. Only if Carruthers
insists that thoughts be expressible in human language,
which he does not, would it be implausible that animals
can think things consciously. I shall argue (in
paragraph 6) that we have overwhelming reason to
believe that animals are conscious, understood in a
way that does not collapse consciousness into
reflective self-consciousness.
It is instructive to note that Rosemary Rodd, who is
both a biologist and philosopher, puts forward five kinds
of consideration in favor of self-consciousness in
animals, a term which she defines as the ability to form
mental concepts about the self and/or to reflect about
one's feelings. 24 First, recognition of external or mirror
images of oneself, as by chimpanzees, is evidence for a
sophisticated ability to think about the self from
'outside' or to displace the concept of self beyond the
physical body. Second, it is reasonable to believe that
members of several primate species other than
chimpanzees possess some ability to have ideas about
their own knowledge because they appear to have ideas
about the knowledge which is available to others or
about others' attitudes and personalities, or they appear
to form hypotheses about the behavior of others and
about the relationships between them and others. Third,
animals must constantly receive information about their
bodies, and to assume that they can have no concepts
about this seems implausible since information about
the self as physical entity must have at least as much
survival value as information about the external
environment. Fourth, the imitation of voluntary
behavior of others, such as an orphaned kitten reared
with and imitating dogs, is one kind of behavior which
seems to be explicable only in terms of some degree of
consciousness of self. Fifth, self-consciousness seems
to evolve gradually, starting from simple beginnings,

the linkage between sign and what is signified (such as
ostension) prior to the acquisition oflanguage; otherwise
the entire process would never get off the ground. In short,
language requires a peg of non-linguistic experience on
which to be hung." 19
4. Self-consciousness in animals
In P3 Carruthers makes two factual claims. First,
humans have the ability to think consciously about their
mental states. Second. animals lack this ability. I shall
discuss the latter claim in this paragraph and the former
in paragraph 5.
Do we have evidence that animals can think
consciously abOut their own mental states? Carruthers
believes that it follows with very little further argument
that animal experiences are non-conscious. 20 He
believes it unlikely that birds, mice, dogs, cats, sheep,
cattle, pigs, or chickens might be thinking things
consciously to themselves, in which case the
experiences of all these creatures are non-conscious
on his analysis. Carruthers makes a little more effort
investigating the possibility that higher primates, such
as chimpanzees, have conscious mental states.21 More
specifically, he asks whether chimpanzees can think
about their own thoughts. Having considered one
example, namely, that of a chimpanzee gathering
eighteen pieces of food from a field where be bad
previously observed the food being hidden in various
places, Carruthers concludes that although the
chimpanzee has a cognitive map of the field, there is
not a shred of evidence to suggest that he is capable
of thinking about his thinking. Carruthers then
suggests "that human beings are unique amongst
members of the animal kingdom in possessing
conscious mental states."22
It is clear that Carruthers dismisses the possibility
ofanimals having the ability to think about their mental
states in a rather cavalier a priori manner. First, he
declines to consider empirical studies of non-primates
like cats, dogs, and the like. Second, he considers only
a single case study of higher primates. Third, be
considers only a single species of higher primates,
namely chimpanzees (and possibly only a single
chimpanzee, but that is not clear). Fourth, he considers
only a single piece of chimpanzee behavior since he is
confident that "(h)ere is about the most intelligent thing
that I know of that a chimpanzee can do."23 Fifth, he
considers only evidence for thinking about thinking and
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of living in compliance with it. This argument fails
because it could at most only be contingently so that
excluding non-rational human beings from direct moral
considerability would lead to social instability. There
have been highly civilized and stable societies which
practised infanticide or euthanasia of the aged.
Conversely, social stability need not be confmed to rules
about human beings, and in future-if it is not already
the case-there might very well be societies in which
the denial of moral standing to animals, or senseless
destruction of the natural environment, would lead to
social instability.
Elsewhere Carruthers presents a third moral
argument for why non-rational humans should be
included in the sphere of direct moral concern. 27 Unlike
animals, non-rational humans share human form and
many human patterns of behavior with those humans
who are rational agents. And since we have a natural
impulse of sympathy for the sufferings of all who share
human form, indifference to the suffering of a non
rational human is wrong because of what it reveals about
one's character. Apart from the notoriously problematic
issue of what is natural and what is acquired in human
nature, I cannot think of any reason why indifference
to the suffering of an animal could not also be wrong
because it reveals a bad character. Surely, higher
primates, for example, share a considerable part of
human form and also many typically human patterns
of behavior. Why then would torturing them not reveal
something about lack ofsensitivity which is part of what
it means to have a bad character?
I conclude that if these three moral arguments fail,
as I think they do, to establish adequate grounds for
including non-rational human beings in the class of
holders of moral rights while excluding animals, then
they would likewise fail were they to be used in an
attempt to include, on empirical and moral grounds,
non-conscious human beings in the class of conscious
human beings while excluding animals.

and probably develops gradually as we grow up. And
if self-consciousness is a matter of degree, then a
sudden break, rather than a continuum, between
humans and animals in respect of the possession of
self-consciousness is implausible.
5. Non-conscious humans
The second factual claim made in P3 is that humans
have the ability to think consciously about their mental
states. Carruthers suggests "that human beings are
unique amongst members of the animal kingdom in
possessing conscious mental states."25 He should
however have qualified the term 'human beings' with
'some' or 'most'. On his analysis the 'pain' of certain
humans-like young babies, severely mentally
defective people, and the very senile-must be a non
conscious mental state just like that of animals because
they cannot think about it.
Earlier in his book, when he still works on the
provisional assumption that animals have conscious
mental states, Carruthers uses two moral arguments in
support of an extension of contractualism (the moral
theory which he favors over utilitarianism) so that it
would include in the class of holders of direct moral
rights human beings who are not rational agents or
rational contractors since they are not normal, adult
human beings. 26 Now it seems to me possible that
someone could attempt to use these arguments, not so
much to show that non-rational humans are holders of
moral rights while animals are not, but to show that
humans who lack the capacity for conscious experience
on Carruthers's analysis (being unable to think about
their mental states) should be treated as if they were
conscious while animals should not be so treated. Given
this possibility, I wish to show that these moral arguments
fail because they have false empirical premises.
First, the slippery slope argument states that the
denial of moral rights to human beings on the ground
that they are not rational agents may land us on a
slippery slope leading to all kinds of barbarism against
those humans who are rational agents. This argument
fails because there is no a priori reason why excluding
animals from direct moral consideration would not
likewise throw one on a slippery slope.
Second. according to the social stability argument,
a rule that withholds moral standing from non-rational
human beings is likely to produce social instability
because many people would fmd themselves incapable
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6. Analogy, evolutionary theory, and animal
consciousness
There is a very strong argument for animal
consciousness. It is a common-sense empirical
argument by analogy from human behavior issuing
from conscious mental states to animal behavior
similarly issuing from conscious mental states. The
analogy is considerably strengthened by a mass of
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problematic examples. But he fails to provide us with
an explanation of what it would be like to interact in a
complex way with the environment, perform tasks,
adapt, learn, and the like without any conscious
experience at all or ever feeling anything. 31
Is all animal behavior simply reflex or instinct? Are
animals automata? Is animal behavior better explained
in terms of the workings of machines or 'hard-wired'
mechanical devices, albeit with the input of non
conscious mental states, than in terms of conscious
mental states, that is, mental contents which are
immediately present to their minds? Does no animal
behavior issue from conscious mental states, such as
conscious experiences, desires, beliefs, or thoughts?
There is a very strong analogical argument which
concludes that the best explanation for complex,
adaptive, flexible animal behavior is that it issues from
consciousness. Before expanding on this analogy, we
need to ask why Carruthers's implied mechanistic
analogy between animals and machines breaks down.
The obvious answer is that there is no strong physical
analogy between animals and machines. Machines are
artifacts, animal species are natural kinds. Machines
contrast with the structural and functional continuity
between humans and animals. The intentionality,
plasticity, and flexibility of the behavior of machines,
which are suggestive of choice, are only apparent since
they are in reality parasitic on, or derivative from, such
descriptions which are given of human behavior which
issues from consciousness and choice. 32
One could of course make the machine model of
animal behavior more sophisticated by using a modem
computer rather than a clock, as Descartes did, as an
example ofa machine. The non-conscious mental states
of animals would then be analogous to software and
animal brains analogous to hardware. Animals
conceived as computers would be non-conscious in the
same way as the most advanced artificial intelligence
has no conscious mental states. Computer-like
manipulation by animals of data in terms of logical or
formal sequences would have syntax but would lack
any semantics or referential meaning for the animals
themselves. The semantics of a computer program is
fully conditional upon the intentionality of the
programmer or other human beings. A computer can
forecast the weather or calculate the inflation rate but
only in a purely logical or formal way without knowing
what the content of that activity is or what in the world
it is about.

scientific fact about neurophysiological and neuro
chemical similarities between humans and animals. And
when this analogical reasoning is located in the context
of the theory of evolution-which postulates physio
logical and anatomical continuity, or evolutionary
kinship, between humans and animals-an opposing
argument that denies any animal consciousness faces
fonnidable odds.
Before I elaborate on this analogical argument, let
us frrst consider what Carruthers is able to muster in its
place for his conclusion that animals are non-conscious.
Ultimately one has to weigh whether Carruthers's
mechanistic explanation of animal behavior is better
than the analogical argument which claims that
consciousness plays a causal role in, or is implicated in
the explanation of, some animal behavior.
In P4 Carruthers states that whereas human beings
have non-conscious as well as conscious mental states,
animals have only non-conscious mental states .. We saw
(in paragraph 3) that he cites three examples of non
conscious experiences in humans. Now, presumably,
these examples illustrate the non-conscious nature of
all animal mental life from which issues animal behavior
and in terms of which animal behavior is to be
explained. But there are problems with regarding these
examples as exemplars in this way. First, the examples
of driving a car and washing dishes without being
consciously aware ofdoing so involve complex habitual
actions without being aware of them. However, we were
consciously aware of these actions in the first place and
this made it possible to learn how to perform them and
to concentrate on, or to be distracted by, something else
while performing them. 28 Second, the example of
blindsight is of people who previously had the ability
to see, and Evelyn Pluhar argues that it makes no sense
in a context where no conscious experience has ever
occurred. 29 Blindsight, it will be recalled, is the ability
to catch balls or identify objects without having any
conscious experience of seeing because of lesions in
the visual cortex. In this regard Bernard Rollin remarks
as follows about Gallup's account of animal conscious
ness which also makes use of the phenomenon of
blindsight: "Why accept a rare, flukish oddity like blind
sight as a metaphor for the multitude of apparently
conscious animal behaviors? There is a huge functional
discrepancy between blind sight and a great deal of, if
not most, animal behavior." 30
So, Carruthers asks us to believe that animals are
non-conscious machines on the basis of these
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mediating similar human behavior in similar circum
stances. This commonsensical analogical inference is
considerably strengthened by growth in scientific
knowledge, not only of animal behavior but also of the
similarities between human and animal bodies. Thus,
since mind presupposes body, or at least certain bodily
structures such as the central nervous system, these
similarities make the common-sense analogy all the
more plausible, certainly more so than a machine
analogy. Bodily similarities involve enzymes and
proteins, physiological and anatomical structures, and
organic functions. In the next paragraph I shall elaborate
on the neurophysiological and neurochemical similarities
between humans and animals in respect of feeling pain.
Here I am simply stating the elements of the analogy.
Why is this a good analogy? Rollin gives an account
of three objective criteria for the ascription of mentation
provided by the nineteenth-century Darwinian scientist.
George Romanes. 36 First, the activities must be of a
living organism. Second, the activities must be of a kind
to suggest the presence of consciousness and choice,
two elements which we recognize as distinctive
characteristics of mind. Third, another criterion is
needed because what seems like intentional or conscious
choice may in fact be automatic or reflex action. It is
possible that mechanisms of the nervous system could
produce, without the mediation or intervention of
conscious mental states, highly coordinated and
apparently intentional muscular movements. This third
criterion then is the ability to adapt to new situations
and to learn from experience. Not only 'intelligent'
behavior but also mental states like emotions and pain
have value since they elicit variable, appropriate
behavior, depending on the circumstances. These, then,
are three objective methods ofdetermining the presence
of subjectivity. Indicators of intentionality, plasticity,
flexibility, and choice are objective signs of subjective
awareness. Studying animal consciousness means
beginning with the facts of our own consciousness and
extending them on the basis of analogy.
What is the alternative if one refuses to accept that
many of the subjective mental states of humans have
analogies in the conscious mental states of animals? It
is to accept that-in spite of all the similarities of
behavior, structure, function, and the like-of all the
animals on the phylogenetic scale, consciousness is only
present in humans. Of course it is possible that only
human brains have developed the capacity to produce
subjective experience over and above non-conscious

What reason do we have then for rejecting a
machine or computer model of animal behavior in
favor of the belief that conscious mental states mediate
some animal behavior? Or are conscious animal
mental states redundant theoretical postulates devoid
of explanatory value? After all, conscious animal
mental states are vague and cannot be directly known,
and animal minds are mysterious and unfathomable
to us. A quick response would be that conscious human
mental states could likewise be vague and incapable
of being known directly notwithstanding human
beings' capacity for natural language. The mind of a
Serb ethnic cleanser, raping a mother and gouging her
son's eyes, could likewise be incomprehensible. Also,
we have very good reason to accept the causal or
explanatory role of inferred conscious mental entities
in much the same way as we do with inferred physical
entities such as electron shells in the minutest
constituents of the physical world and quarks in the
enormity of outer space. 33
But there is a better response. There is a widespread
common-sense belief that animals have conscious
mental states which play a causal role in their behavior
and serve as better explanations of their behavior in
many specific instances than reductionist accounts
which exclude explanatory mental categories. Our
everyday speech and the way in which we treat animals
that we know reflect this common-sense belief. We
make an empirical inference or postulation by analogy
from the complex causal connection between our own
mental states, such as desires and beliefs, and our own
actions to the existence of animal mental states which
play a causal and explanatory role in animal behavior.
So, our common-sense understanding across cultures
analogically ascribes mental properties to animals. Why
is this? Rodd suggests that the "central reason why we
believe that other people and animals have experience
is that we are conscious and we have an innate tendency
to ascribe consciousness to entities which act in ways
which we recognize as signs of sensation."34 We know
that we can fmd out what animals prefer if we present
them with a choice of alternatives. 35 Our common-sense
knowledge ofanimal behavior is the cumulative wisdom
of centuries of sharing this world with them.
In essence, we believe that the complexity, plasticity,
adaptability or flexibility of animal behavior in
situations of choice give us good inductive reason to
believe that animals have mental states which mediate
their behavior analogous to human mental states
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members of the same species. Which pet owner cannot
tell some tale or another, such as the difference in the
ability ofindividual cats to learn how to use a trap door?
Apart from addressing the last premise in Carruthers's
arguments, in the next paragraph I shall move beyond a
general assertion of evolutionary continuity of
consciousness by looking at the behavior of animals in
situations that humans would fmd painful or stressful
and asking whether we have reason to believe that
animals actually feel pain or experience distress.

information processing and behavior control, but in the
light of the analogical argument for animal mental
states, this is an arbitrary assumption. That only the
human brain, and no brain of any other species, has
precisely the level of development at which conscious
ness becomes possible seems like an anthropocentric
assumption. 37 It is far more plausible to believe that
consciousness in all its manifestations forms a
continuum across species lines.
There is, however, one crucial consideration which
puts the arbitrariness of an anthropocentric assumption
beyond question. If we locate the common-sense
understanding ofanimal consciousness, scientific fact,
and the argument from analogy within the context of a
background theory, namely, the theory ofevolution, we
have overwhelming reason to reject a mechanistic
model of animal bebavior.38 The theory of evolution is
a well-confirmed, respectable scientifiC theory ofgreat
simplicity and wide explanatory power. It postulates
evolutionary continuity or kinship between humans and
animals and shatters the traditional divide between the
two. Humans are part of the animal kingdom, and
precisely the same forces which shape animal nature
are at work in the shaping ofhuman nature, even though
humans have attained a kind of mental capacity which
is a considerable advance upon that ofanimals. Humans
and animals alike are genetically shaped in a complex
and slow process ofinteraction with their ever-changing
external environment in such a way that they can best
be adapted to survive. The theory ofevolution explains
biological phenomena, and it tells us why consciousness
has survival valne. And if having a mind bas survival
value for humans, then, given the physiological
preconditions for mind as well as evolutionary
continuity, having a mind would likewise have survival
value for animals.
So, common sense, scientific fact, the logic of
argument by analogy, and the theory of evolution
combine to make the ascription of conscious mental
states to animals far more plausible than Carruthers's
machine hypothesis. Of course, what I have said is still
very general. One would have to look at particular case
studies to make specific inferences about particular
animal mental states in particular circumstances. But
this can be done, and is being done, with varying degrees
ofsuccess.39 Some animals behave in ways that are quite
different from the ways in which humans behave in
similar circumstances, and there are behavior variations
among different kinds of species and among individual
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7. Animal pain, distress, and suffering

Carruthers's P5 says that having the capacity for
conscious mental states, such as the capacity for
conscious experience of pain, is a necessary condition
for being an object of moral concern that makes claims
upon our sympathy. (A sufficient condition of moral
standing for him bas to be understood in the context of
a Rawlsian agreement or contract among rational agents
and encompassing only human beings.) The capacity
to experience pain could quite rightly be said to be a
kind of bottom-line mental capacity for grounding moral
standing. But consistently with his denial that animals
can have conscious mental states, Carruthers denies that
animals can feel pain.
Carruthers claims that pain, like any other mental
state, admits of conscious and non-conscious varieties.40
He concedes that there are no uncontroversial examples
of non-conscious pain in humans which are parallel to
our everyday examples of non-conscious visual
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What do we understand by tbe concept of pain? A
common-sense understanding of pain necessarily
includes a sensation or. feeling that is intrinsically
unpleasant Pain, say David DeGrazia and Andrew N.
Rowan, is either a particular kind of unpleasant
sensation-identified by a particular phenomenological
quality-or is a particular qualitative range ofunpleasant
sensations.42 Pain is by defmition experienced so that
expressions such as 'unexperienced pain' or 'unfelt pain'
are self-contradictory. Similarly, according to common
sense and ordinary language, Carruthers's notion ofnon
conscious pain is self-contmdictory.
Pain is, however, more than a sensation or feeling.
Scientific work suggests that the human model of pain
has three components, each of which provides an area
of evidence for animal pain.43 The first component of
pain is nociception or the detection of noxious stimuli
which does not involve any conscious awareness. 44
Nociception is the detection of (potentially) tissue
damaging stimuli by specialized neural end-organs
with accompanying behavioral events, such as the
reflexive withdmwal of the affected part of the body
from the source of injury. Nociceptors exist in all
mammals and birds, and evidence suggests the
existence ofnociception in all vertebrates and possibly
in some invertebrates such as cephalopods, for
example, octopi and squids.
The second component of pain is the perception of
noxious stimuli.45 This is pain as feeling or sensation.
One perceives noxious stimuli, but one does not
perceive pain because pain is by defmition perceived.
One bas, feels, or experiences pain. Several neuro
anatomical aspects of the sensation component of pain
are relevant to the question whether animals can feel
pain. First, all vertebrates possess the requisite spinal
aspects of pain perception, namely, neural connections
between peripheral nociceptors and central nervous
structures. It is doubtful that insects feel pain because
they lack the extensive nervous system processing
mechanisms that appear to be necessary' for pain, and
tbeir behavior, wben faced with noxious stimuli, can
be explained by tbe nociceptive reflex. 46 Second, the
thalamus and primary sensory cortex are the supm
spinal structures implicated in pain perception, but there
is uncertainty about the activity of the cerebral cortex
in pain sensation. There are anatomical differences
between species in the cerebral cortex, and these may
have important implications for pain sensation and
emotional response to pain (the third component of

experience. Carruthers then asks whether there are cases
of pain parallel to those of blindsight. that is. cases
where the full, or nearly full, range of pain-behavior, is
displayed without the subject being conscious of or
feeling any pain. He concludes that he has no knowledge
that such cases have actually occurred, but that the
neurophysiology of pain perception suggests that they
are in principle possible but then only as a result of
surgical intervention. He then considers an imaginary
example of someone who is never conscious of any
pain in ber legs, but who displays much of the normal
pain-behavior wben she suffers injury in that region.
Carruthers concludes that this imaginary case of non
conscious pain, or "ofevents that otherwise occupy the
normal causal role of pain, but which are not available
to be thought about consciously and spontaneously by
tbe subject," is Oogically and physically) possible.41
Pain, like other mental states, admits of conscious and
non-conscious varieties, but since animals are incapable
of thinking about their own mental states, their pains
must all be non-conscious ones.
There are three ways in which to resist this wildly
counter-intuitive conclusion. We have already looked
at two of these, namely, a critical analysis of
Carruthers's distinction between conscious and non
conscious mental states (paragraph 3), and an
empirical explomtion of the possibility that animals
have conscious mental states even on his flawed
analysis of this distinction (paragmph 4). Here I wish
to explore a third way, that is, the neurophysiology
and neurochemistry of pain (and related notions) in
humans and animals. This is an area of investigation
which Carruthers simply disregards---as, unfortunately,
do too many philosophers-in his attempt to make a
case for tbe non-existence of animal pain and suffering.
He prefers to use an imaginary example of non
conscious pain (which, as he himself admits, is not a
reality like blindsight) and to rely on an a priori analysis
in which he intellectualizes suffering. Against
Carruthers one could insist that the elements for a strong
analogical argument for animal pain and suffering are
provided by scientific knowledge about the bodily
prerequisites for pain in humans and animals, coupled
with evidence from observation of pain-like behavior
in humans and animals in the appropriate circumstances.
To deny that animals can feel pain, in spite of all the
similarities between human and animal bodies and
behavior, is extremely odd, if not bizarre, as the quota
tion from Voltaire under the title of this paper suggests.
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pain). Similarity of these neural prerequisites for pain
permits the possibility of pain sensation in all
vertebrates, but there are qualitative and quantitative
differences in pain sensation grounded in rapid sensory
discriminatory ability and in the greater influence of
cognition (made possible by the third component of
pain). Third, endogenous pain-control or pain
modulating mechanisms are constituted by both
complex descending pain-control circuits and the
opiate system (endogenous opioid peptides, such as
endorphins). These mechanisms probably exist in all
mammals, and there is even evidence for them in
invertebrates such as earthworms. Fourth, there is stress
induced analgesia consisting of an opioid-dependent and
a non-opioid system, both of which can be activated by
nociceptive stimulation and by various psychological
stresses, such as exposure to a novel environment It
involves supra-spinal mechanisms, but available data
is limited. In sheep, for example, the non-opioid system
predominates.
The third component of pain is motivational
affective, involving cognitive and emotional
capacities. 47 Noxious stimuli or sensory inputs are not
only felt or sensed, but are cognitively evaluated or
interpreted and result in emotional behavioror affective
response. Hence pain is defined not merely as sensation,
but as unpleasant sensation. Both evaluation and
behavioral response require a certain level of cognitive
ability which in tum is grounded in, or made possible
by, the cerebral cortex. The motivational-affective
component may assume greater complexity and
importance in the pain perception of animals with a
developed cerebral cortex. The minimal level of
cognitive development for pain perception remains
speculative. It is suggested that only the most
rudimentary level is required, and on this basis pain is
recognized in all vertebrate species.
Given these three components of pain, as well as
pain-associated behavior, we have solid grounds for
believing that all vertebrate species are capable ofpain.
This is not the case with imputing the capacity for pain
to invertebrates, but evidence of pain-associated
behavior in some invertebrates should give one reason
to pause. It is not known what the capacity for
motivational-affective modulation of pain is in less
complex vertebrates such as fish, amphibians and
reptiles. In mammals, pain sensation is modulated by
emotional and cognitive modalities. Great apes have a
level of cognitive development which indicates that
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cognitive processes are likely to have a greater
influence on their experience of pain. Human beings
differ from animals in the cognitive modalities of pain
perception, cognition being a major determinant of
their pain perception. In short, the neurophysiology,
neurochemistry, and behavioral repertoire of pain
support the thesis that many if not all vertebrates
experience pain. 48
Pain and suffering are related but not identical
concepts. I may be in pain (that is, have a nociceptive
response to a knife thrust into my arm, have a hurtful
sensation, and have a cognitive and emotional response
to both this action and hurtful sensation) without
suffering. Suffering, unlike pain, is not a sensation and
is not locatable in particular body parts.49 When does
the experience of pain involve suffering? Suffering
could be defined as the unpleasant emotional response
to more than minimal pain or distress. 5° Emotions are
thus implicated in pain as well as suffering, but the
emotion induced by suffering is the result of pain with
a raised level of intensity or duration.
Suffering is, however, not only caused by pain but
also by distress. Distress is a state in which a human or
animal is unable to adapt to an altered environment or
to altered internal stimuli.51 Distress can take different
forms, such as anxiety, fear, or boredom. Anxiety, for
example, can be defmed as "an emotional response

typically unpleasant, typically involving heightened
arousal and attentiveness to the environment, and
typically inhibiting action-to the perception ofa threat
to one's well-being or to one's ego (sense ofself)."52 It
is not clear whether anxiety is, like pain, always felt,
but in the context of animal welfare felt anxiety is of
most interest. In this definition 'perception' of threat
allows for cases where no real threat exists, and threat
to 'ego' accommodates typically human cases. Anxiety
causes people to feel more pain given a particular
stimulus;53 the experience of pain can be attenuated or
accentuated by emotion.54 Clearly, then, the concepts
of pain, distress (anxiety and the like), and suffering
are located in the same conceptual field.
Are animals capable of experiencing anxiety?
There are good reasons, based on analogical inference
from observable facts, for believing that they do.
Anxiety in humans as well as inferred 'anxious' states
in animals are accompanied by typical anxious
behavior, are modulated in the same way by drugs,
and produce neurophysiological and neurochemical
changes. Symptoms characteristic of states of anxiety,
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suffering is caused by pain or distress (such as anxiety)
that is more than minimal.
I have merely given a crude outline of conceptual
and empirical considerations-both behavioral and
anatomical similarity, set in the context ofevolutionary
kinship-relevant to the possibility of animal pain,
distress, and suffering. But it is sufficient to provide
adequate primafacie reason to distrust Carruthers's case
against (conscious) animal pain, pain for him being an
avoidance mechanism without feeling, a case grounded
in imaginary examples and a priori argument. Although
animals do not have the most sophisticated intellectual
abilities, associated with human language, to evaluate
and interpret pain, distress or suffering, we have
overwhelming scientific evidence to support the
widespread commonsensical belief, grounded in the
human analogy, that animals do feel pain, are anxious,
and do suffer.

which are observed in both humans and animals in
circumstances that cause human anxiety, are motor
tension (shakiness, etc.), autonomic hyperactivity
(sweating, pounding heart, etc.), apprehensive
expectation (inhibition ofbehavioral repertoire in novel
situations), and hyperattentiveness (vigilance and
scanning).55 Animals have been used in experiments to
develop anxiety-relieving drugs for humans. The
neurochemical basis of anxiety is the benzodiazepine
receptors in the central nervous system in human
beings and animals. 56 Benzodiazepine receptors are
present in vertebrate species, including fish, but no
significant levels have been detected in invertebrates.57
In other words, the physiological basis of anxiety,
namely receptor sites for benzodiazepine, exists in all
vertebrates. 58 Studies in monkeys and rats, for
example, demonstrate that benzodiazepine receptors
are involved in both the affective and physiological
manifestations of anxiety in these species, although
there are species variations.59
Thus, the analogical argument for animal anxiety
moves from anxiety in humans, evidenced by human
anxious behavior and benzodiazepine receptors, to
inferred animal anxiety, evidenced by animal anxious
behavior and benzodiazepine receptors. It is an
empirical argument from behavioral and neural
similarities to conscious mental states. This analogy
gives us excellent reason for believing that mental states
mediate between the physical or psychological anxiety
inducing stimulus and the physiological anxious
response, thus rejecting the claim that anxiety (and other
forms of distress) in animals is simply a mechanical
physical matter. 60
Finally, are animals capable of suffering
induced by pain or distress (such as anxiety)? Given
that suffering is defined as the unpleasant emotional
response to pain or distress, the question of animal
suffering raises the question of animal emotion. In the
discussion of the three components of pain, I have
already suggested that there are behavioral and neural
analogies between humans and animals which give us
inductive reason to infer animal emotions. Emotions
modulate pain and anxious experiences. Since emotion
is the affective response to an evaluation and
interpretation of sensory inputs from the internal and
external environment, evidence of the existence of
emotion supports the possibility of pain and anxious
experiences. Animals, then, can suffer in the form of
having an unpleasant emotional response, and their
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8. Ethics and non-conscious animals

Carruthers's moral conclusion, C2, is that animals
are not objects of moral concern that make claims on
our sympathy. He believes that if he is right about the
non-consciousness of animal mental states, "then it
ought to be strictly impossible to feel sympathy for
animals, once the true nature of their mental contents
is properly understood... The truth may be that it is
only our imperfect rationality that enables us to feel
sympathy for animals at all." 61 This is a far-reaching
conclusion, and Carruthers does not shy away from
spelling out its consequences: "The most important
practical conclusion of this book is that there is no basis
for extending moral protection to animals beyond that
which is already provided."62 In particular, there are no
good moral grounds for forbidding hunting, factory
farming, or laboratory testing on animals. Feelings of
sympathy for animals "serve only to divert attention
from the claims of those who do have moral standing,
namely human beings."63
Just as key premises in Carruthers's argument are
false, C2 is also false. His moral conclusion is a species
of educated folly which deserves to be buried along
with its seventeenth-century Cartesian ancestors. From
a dubious philosophy of mind he draws a moral
conclusion which, if acted upon, would serve to
stabilize the status quo. An alternative conclusion
supported by common sense, the logic of analogical
reasoning and the theory ofevolution-is that sentient
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2 See Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A
History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1983).

animals, that is, animals that are capable of pain and
suffering, have moral standing and, as such, set limits
to our actions in virtue of what they are in themselves.
On this alternative conclusion practices like factory
farming cause unspeakable suffering. To claim that
expending time and energy on this moral issue diverts
attention from the needs of human beings is to suggest
that one can only properly pay attention to one thing
in one's life-plan, or that animal welfare and human
welfare are mutually exclusive. These are not the case.
Life is indeed too short to pursue all worthwhile causes
at once. But one could argue persuasively that
domesticated animals are part of human communities
and are owed duties of care and gratitude. Regard for
animals is not an invention of a decadent moral
society,64 but is a human moral sense which has deep
historical and social roots. 65 Moreover, vested
economic interests, structural political power, and
human wickedness are far more fundamental and
pervasive causes of a failure to address human
suffering than the animal rights (animal welfare;
animal protection) movement. But this is another issue.
In conclusion, Carruthers, having argued that
animals have only non-conscious mental states,
cautions that his argument is controversial and
speculative, and that it may well turn out to be
unsound.66 Consequently, it may be wiser, he says, to
continue to respond to animals as if their mental states
were conscious ones until a consensus emerges
amongst philosophers and psychologists concerning
the nature of consciousness, and among ethologists
over the cognitive powers of animals. The good news
is, however, that consciousness is being regained in
both psychology and ethology and that philosophy has
long ago dumped logical positivism, the bedfellow of
behaviorism, which denies consciousness. A lack of
consensus on animal consciousness may very well be
explained, in part at least. by the vested interests of
researchers who do routine science within a scientific
paradigm which denies animals consciousness. 67
Biology has unfortunately been slow to follow physics
in accepting inferred unobservables as respectable
explanatory concepts.
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